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NOTES
The Simplification of Subpart F
by Daniel P. Shepherdson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The function of taxation is to generate revenues sufficient for financing
governmental activities and to operate as a mechanism of redistribu-
tive economic and social policy.1 Each congressional decision to impose
the burden of a tax balances the need to generate revenue against the
public policy goal of encouraging or discouraging the particular targeted
activity upon which the tax incidence falls. Although constitutional lim-
its restrict the congressional exercise of the taxing power over domestic
activity,2 arguably few legal limits restrict the full exercise of U.S. tax
jurisdiction over U.S. citizens,3 foreign corporations and nonresident
alien individuals on their foreign source income.4 The exercise of ex-
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1985).
1 See generally WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION AND THE INCOME TAX (A. Leibowits ed. 1978);
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TAXATION (A. Peacock & F. Forte eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Peacock & Forte]; Houtte, Principles of Interpretation in Internal and International Tax Law, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXATION SINCE WORLD WAR I (International Bureau of Fiscal Documenta-
tion 1968) (provides a scholarly methodology for the interpretation of national tax laws and interna-
tional tax conventions); van Hoorn, Problems, Possibilities, and Limitations with Respect to Measures
Against International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 8 GA. J. INT'L COMP. L. 763, 763-66 (1978).
2 The Supreme Court has implicitly acknowledged, albeit in dicta, that:
[A]lthough a particular exertion of power by Congress was not restrained by any express
limitation of the Constitution, if by the perverted exercise of such power so great an abuse
was manifested as to destroy fundamental rights which no free government could consist-
ently violate, that it would be the duty of the judiciary to hold such acts to be void upon
the assumption that the Constitution by necessary implication forbade them.
McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 63 (1904). See, ag., U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process
clause); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
3 The Supreme Court has upheld the exercise of Congressional taxing power over U.S. citizens
on their worldwide income. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
4 See Norr, Jurisdiction to Tax and International Income, 17 TAX L. REv. 431 (1962). But see
Albrecht, The Taxation ofAliens Under International Law, 29 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 145 (1952). See
generally Choate, Hurok & Klein, Federal Tax Policy for Foreign Income and Foreign Taxpayers--
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tended, nonterritorial tax jurisdiction often results in the imposition of
double taxation on transnational business transactions.' This burden on
foreign source income has, however, been mitigated by the foreign tax
credit, 6 tax treaty provisions7 and the deferral mechanism.8
The Subpart F provisions9 were enacted as a partial exception to the
deferral mechanism in order to promote greater tax neutrality 0 between
History, Analysis and Prospects, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 441, 444-47 (1971); L. KRAUSE & K. DAM, FED-
ERAL TAX TREATMENT oF FOREIGN INCOME 107-11 app. (1964).
5 See van Hoorn supra note 1, at 767-69; J. ADAMS & J. WHALLEY, THE INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 41-46 (1977); see gener-
ally Sherfy, Background of General Policy, in TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME 227-40 (Tax Institute
of America 1966).
6 I.R.C. §§ 33, 901-04 (1983). See generally B. BrrITER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 17.11 (4th ed. 1979); 1-4 R. RHOADES & M.
LANGER, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS §§ 5.01-5.09 (1984); B. BITrT-
KER & L. EBB, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME AND FOREIGN PERSONS 210-74
(1968); J. BISCHEL & R. FEINSCHREIBER, FUNDAMENTALS OF INT ,RNATIONAL TAXATION 47-62
(1977); P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXA-
TION 68-84 (1977); 1-3 E. OWENS, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXA-
TION: CASES AND MATERIALS 33-128 (1980) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS]; E.
OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT (1961).
7 See generally INCOME TAX TREATIES (J. Bischel ed. 1978); 1-2 TAX TREATIES (CCH); JOINT
COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX, 87 CONG. Isr SSS., 1-4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
TAX CONVENTIONS (1962); Surrey, International Tax Conventions: How They Operate and What
They Accomplish, 23 J. TAX'N 364 (1965); Hadari, Tax Treaties and Their Role in the Financial
Planning of the Multinational Enterprises, 20 AMER. J. COMP. L. 111 (1972); Trelles, Double Taxa-
tion/Fiscal Evasion and International Tax Treaties, 12 IND. L. REv. 341 (1979); Houtte, supra note
1, at 11:9 and 11:36-43; 3-4 RL RHOADES & M. LANGER, supra note 6; Owens, United States Income
Tax Treaties Their Role in Relieving Double Taxation, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 428 (1963).
8 "There is no explicit statutory rule providing for deferral of the United States tax on foreign
source income. Rather, deferral arises out of the basic jurisdictional distinctions between domestic
and foreign corporations." 3 INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, supra note 6, at 6. For the relative statu-
tory provisions that implicitly provide for the deferral mechanism see I.R.C. §§ 861-64, 871-76, 881-
82 (1983).
9 I.R.C. §§ 951-64 (1983). See generally SUBPART F- FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES AND THEIR TAX
CONSEQUENCES (R. Feinschreiber ed. 1979) (providing a thorough explication of Subpart F) [here-
inafter cited as Feinschreiber]; The Report of the President's Task Force on Business Taxation-
1970, reprinted in 24 TAX LAW. 395 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Task Force]; STAFF OF SENATE
COMM. ON FINANCE, 93 CONG., 2D SEss., A SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATION RECOMMENDATIONS
ON U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME AND FOREIGN PERSONS (Comm. Print 1974); HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM
326-41 (Comm. Print 1978).
10 The goal of tax neutrality is to place an equal tax burden on both foreign and domestic
investment. Ideally, tax considerations should not be dispositive factors in the decision to invest in
either foreign or domestic business operations. However, all other considerations being equal, the
benefit of deferral strongly favors foreign investment over domestic investment, although without
deferral foreign operations of U.S. multinational enterprises (MNE's) would be at a competitive
disadvantage relative to our foreign competitors that generally retain the benefit of deferral. On the
other hand, the termination of deferral (which would harm our competitive position in international
trade) would eliminate the tax inequity existing between foreign and domestic investment. See gen-
SUBPART F
foreign and domestic investment by U.S. multinational enterprises
(MNE's).11 The provisions, however, are excessively complex. 2 This
note will examine the policy and the mechanics of the Subpart F provi-
sions and propose some alternatives to the existing regime.
II. INTERNATIONAL TAX MINIMIZATION
The application of U.S. income tax laws to international business
transactions is complicated by a lack of uniformity among national tax-
ing systems and a host of definitional inconsistencies regarding, for exam-
ple: (1) forms of business organization; (2) types and levels of tax; (3)
accounting practices; (4) source of income; (5) source/location of tangi-
ble and intangible property rights; (6) financial privacy; and, (7) informa-
tion gathering.13 The general effect of these inconsistent definitional
complexities on the international tax liability of U.S. multinational enter-
prises (MNE's) engaged in transnational business transactions may be
either the double taxation of income 14 or, in the alternative, the complete
escape from income tax liability altogether.1 The potential burden of
double taxation may discourage U.S. MNE's from engaging in interna-
tional trade. 6 On the other hand, the deferral mechanism provides an
inequitable benefit to U.S. MNE's with foreign operations as compared
to U.S. corporations with similar domestic operations.17 The problem of
double taxation and deferral, and the complexity of their national or in-
ternational resolution, may encourage active international tax
minimization.' 8
erally L. KRAUSE & K. DAM, supra note 4, at 44-84; Hufbauer & Foster, U.S. Taxation of the
Undistributed Income of Controlled Foreign Corporations, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL TAXA-
TION: 1976, at 13-19 (1976).
Moreover, there are some countervailing considerations. Many of the tax expenditures (i.e.
subsidies) available to domestic corporations are not available to foreign corporations. See, eg.,
I.R.C. §§ 48(a)(2), 168, 904, 921-27, 991-97 (1983). See also infra note 32 (domestic deductions
permitted to a foreign taxpayer are limited).
11 See generally R. BA ENrTr & I. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE MUL-
TINATIONAL CORPORATION (1974); Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise A New Challenge for
Transnational Law, 83 HARv. L. REv. 739 (1970).
12 "[O]ne of the most controversial aspects of the U.S. international tax structure over the past
three decades has been the income tax treatment of foreign corporations, controlled by U.S. share-
holders." P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, supra note 6, at 16. See B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note
6, at § 17.11 (17:62); Feinschreiber, supra note 9; 1 R. Rhoades & M. Langer, supra note 6, at
§ 3.01[1].
13 See Forry & Lerner, Taxing Multinational Enterprises Basic Issues of International Income
Tax Harmonization, 10 INT'L LAW. 623 (1976).
14 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Is Forty & Lerner, supra note 13, at 623-24.
16 J. BISCHEL & R. FEINSCHREIBER, supra note 6, at 8.
17 See L. KRAUSE & K. DAM, supra note 4, at 11-13.
18 International tax minimization is somewhat of a misnomer. In fact, no international tax is
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A. The United States Tax System
The two general methods of national taxation are: (1) territoriality
jurisdictions-which impose the incidence of taxation on the basis that
the source of the income lies within the national boundaries;' 9 and, (2)
domiciliary jurisdictions- which impose the incidence of taxation on the
worldwide income of the taxpayer based upon the status within the juris-
diction.2' The second method is a much broader expression of national
tax jurisdiction and will result in overlapping tax liabilities for foreign
source income initially taxed by foreign countries under source
principles.
"The United States Internal Revenue Code subjects the global in-
come of all the earth's inhabitants and corporations to the United States
income tax. The limitations on jurisdictional reach are found in subse-
actually minimized or avoided. Rather, the term encompasses the ability to minimize the burden of
various national tax liabilities for transnational business transactions. As an illustration, assume a
U.S. MNE, the X corporation, has a wholly-owned subsidiary, Z corporation, organized in a low-tax
jurisdiction. Further, assume that the tax rate for the X corporation in the United States and the Y
corporation in Brazil is 46%, whereas the tax rate for Z corporation is .05%. In order to minimize
the overall tax liabilities, the X corporation could structure the transaction as follows: (1) The Y
corporation could sell the raw materials to the Z corporation at cost and, therefore, there would be
no profit in Brazil and Brazil would receive no tax; (2) the X corporation could then buy the raw
materials from the Z corporation at the price at which X will sell the raw materials after they have
been manufactured into a finished good and, therefore, there would be no profit in the United States
and the United States would receive no tax; and (3) the Z corporation will accumulate the profits in
the transaction because the purchase price was understated and the selling price was overstated and,
therefore, the low-tax jurisdiction will receive the tax. Through this intracompany pricing mecha-
nism, the X corporation will be able to minimize the international tax liability on the transnational
business transaction by accumulating profits in a low-tax jurisdiction.
The line between tax avoidance (legal) and tax evasion (illegal) is often difficult to draw, particu-
larly in the area of international taxation. Certainly, the potential burden of double taxation will
encourage aggressive tax minimization planning. Moreover, the problems of access to financial in-
formation, definitional inconsistencies and the inability to enforce national tax judgments in foreign
courts will further compound the ability of tax authorities to enforce national tax laws. See generally
H. BALTER & J. GUIDoTri, TAX FRAUD AND EVASION §§ 2.01-2.05 (5th ed. 1983); 1 B.
BRACEWELL-MILNES & M. WISSELINIK, INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE 27-63, 191-309, 333-
47 (1979); Note, Transnational Evasion of United States Taxation, 81 HARV. L. REv. 876 (1968);
van Hoorn, supra note 1; Gordon, Tax Havens and Their Use by United States Taxpayers--An Over-
view, in TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON INTERNATIONAL TAxATIoN 191, 261-63 (Practicing
Law Institute 1981) [hereinafter cited as Gordon Report].
A tension exists between the burden of double taxation and the related problems of fiscal eva-
sion. A coherent and consistent national or international resolution of the two difficulties may,
ultimately, be impossible. This is so because, theoretically, "the greater the administrative reach [of
national tax laws], the more concern with [the burden] of double taxation by the taxpayer, the
greater the relief from double taxation, the greater the desire of government to extends its adminis-
trative reach." Trelles, supra note 7, at 345.
19 See Norr, supra note 4, at 434-37.
20 Shoup, Taxation of Multinational Corporations, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, supra note
6, at 45-48; Norr, supra note 4, at 433.
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quent Code provisions."21 Some scholars have argued that these limita-
tions are voluntarily self-imposed and that theoretically they are neither
compelled by the U.S. Constitution22 nor by principles of international
law.23 Other scholars, however, have argued that "[tlhe right to tax
aliens is a prerogative of the sovereign state-a prerogative which is lim-
ited by rules of customary and conventional international law."'24
Even granting that there are no constitutional or international law
limits on the power of the United States to exercise its tax jurisdiction, a
critical distinction must be noted between the power to impose a tax and
the related power to enforce and collect the tax. Although the power of
the United States to impose a tax on extraterritorial activity may be lim-
itless, in practice the inability to enforce and collect the tax operates as a
practical limitation of the arbitrary extension of a nation's tax
jurisdiction.2"
The United States imposes the incidence of taxation on U.S. citizens,
resident alien individuals and domestic corporations on their worldwide
income.26 The United States imposes the incidence of taxation on non-
resident alien individuals and foreign corporations27 on U.S. source in-
come,28 or income that is "effectively connected with the conduct of a
trade or business within the United States."29 A corollary to this holds
that nonresident alien individuals and foreign corporations are not taxed
on foreign source income, nor on income that is not effectively connected
21 2 INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, supra note 6, at 4. For an overview of U.S. tax jurisdiction
regarding international business transactions see generally I R. RIOADES & M. LANGER, supra note
6, at §§ 1.11-1.14; B. BITTKER & L. EBB, supra note 6, at 30-112; J. BISCHEL & R. FEINSCHREIBER,
supra note 6, at 5-11; P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, supra note 6, at 36-38. For a general discussion of
the constitutional and international law limits regarding the taxation of foreign income see supra
note 4.
22 Choate, Hurok & Klein, supra note 4, at 444.
23 Norr, supra note 4, at 431.
24 Albrecht, supra note 4, at 185. See Liebman, Note on the Tax Treatment of Joint Venture
Income Under Subpart F. An Addendum, 32 Bus. LAW. 1819, 1825-26 (1977).
25 The extraterritorial application of national tax laws raises procedural problems of recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments: "[For no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of
another." Holman v. Johnson, I Cowp. 341, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (1775). See Note, The
Nonrecognition of Foreign Tax Judgements: International Tax Evasion, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 241
(1981); see also Atik, The Problem of Reciprocity in Transnational Enforcement of Tax Judgments, 8
YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 156 (1981) (the author proposes a refined concept of reciprocity called
"structural reflection" which embodies principles of comity and elements of compatibility as a re-
placement for the norm of non-enforcement in the transnational tax judgment area).
26 I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 61 (1983).
27 Id. §§ 871, 881, 882, 7701(a)(3), (4), (5), 7701(b).
28 Id. § 861 (defines U.S. source income); Id. § 862 (defines income from sources without the
United States); Id. § 871(a) (imposes tax on nonresident alien individuals for U.S. source income);
Id. § 881 (imposes tax on foreign corporations for U.S. source income).
29 Id. § 871(b)(1) (for nonresident alien individuals); Iad. § 882(a)(2) (for foreign corporations);
Id, § 864(c) (general rule).
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with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.3" In-
come of nonresident alien individuals and foreign corporations which
satisfies the "effectively connected" test is taxed at normal rates on a net
basis,3" and ordinary deductions permitted to a domestic taxpayer are
also permitted to a foreign taxpayer.32 However, income which fails the
"effectively connected" test but satisfies the "United States source" test is
taxable at a fixed thirty percent rate on the gross amount received.3
B. Double-Taxation
The cumulative effect of the national taxation of worldwide income
is the double taxation of foreign source income." The income is taxed
initially in the source country on the basis of the territoriality principle
and, additionally, the income is taxed in the home country on the basis of
the domiciliary principle. A tax regime that imposes the burden of
double taxation operates as a disincentive to international trade and may
even encourage active, aggressive tax minimization planning.35
Despite this problem, no multilateral or international law regime
has been established for the satisfactory prevention of double taxation or
the concomitant problem of international tax avoidance. However, bilat-
eral treaties that effectively provide for the prevention of double taxation
have been negotiated, primarily between developed countries.3 6 In the
absence of a bilateral treaty, unilateral national measures are the primary
means of preventing the double taxation that results from the imposition
of tax incidence of a worldwide basis.37 Such unilateral measures, how-
ever, operate solely to the disadvantage of the enacting countries.38
The United States utilizes a unilateral measure in order to alleviate
the burden of double taxation. The United States employs a dollar-for-
dollar foreign tax credit,39 which is available to citizens and domestic
30 This exclusion is implicit in the express enumeration of the scope of taxable income for
nonresident alien individuals and foreign corporations in I.R.C. §§ 871 and 881-882. Resident alien
was redefined in 1984. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3) (1984) (discusses the use of a "substantial presence test"
and a "closer connection" analysis).
31 See supra note 29.
32 Such deductions, however, are limited "only if and to the extent that they are connected
with income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United
States." I.R.C. §§ 873(a), 882(c)(1) (1983).
33 Id. §§ 871(a), 881(a).
34 See supra note 5.
35 See supra note 18.
36 See supra note 7.
37 Generally, European countries grant an exemption for foreign taxes, while Anglo-American
countries and Japan rely on a foreign tax credit mechanism. See L. KRAUSE & K. DAM, supra note
4, at 114-15.
38 See Trelles, supra note 7, at 349-50; Owens, supra note 7, at 431-33.
39 See supra note 6.
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corporations for "any income, war profits, and excess profits taxes paid
or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country."'4 Therefore,
U.S. taxpayers get a domestic tax credit for foreign taxes which are paid.
"The purpose of the foreign tax credit is to eliminate double taxation of
foreign-source income. In effect, the foreign tax is treated as a down
payment on the domestic taxpayer's U.S. tax liability with respect to that
income."'" In other words, the United States taxes foreign source in-
come the same as it taxes domestic income; however, the United States
grants a generous credit for foreign taxes which are paid.
Apart from treaties, this is the primary means used for the reduction
of the burden of double taxation.42 Unlike treaties, however, which are
negotiated on a bilateral basis, the foreign tax credit is a unilateral mea-
sure that subordinates U.S. taxation of foreign source income to the for-
eign tax. Moreover, the effectiveness of the foreign tax credit as a means
of reducing or eliminating the burden of double taxation is limited.g3
Double taxation will continue for income subject to foreign taxes which
are not within the enumeration of the foreign tax credit provision.
C. The Problem of Deferral
The United States taxes the income of corporations and their share-
holders separately." The result of this scheme is that the corporation, as
an entity, is taxed initially on the corporate income45 and, if it then de-
clares a dividend distribution out of after-tax income, this is taxable to
the shareholder." Although the corporate entity is taxed on accumu-
lated earnings, the shareholder is generally not taxed on such earnings; 7
rather, the shareholder is taxed only on cash or disproportionate divi-
dends received.4" This regime applies equally to U.S. shareholders of do-
mestic and foreign corporations.49
The benefit of deferral arises for U.S. shareholders of foreign corpo-
rations with non-U.S. source and non-effectively connected income as a
40 1.11.C. -§ 901(b) (1983).
41 B. BrrrKER & I EusricE, supra note 6, at § 17.11 (17:31).
42 See supra note 7.
43 Trelles, supra note 7, at 349-50.
44 I.R.C. §§ 301-16 (1983). See generally B. BrrrER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 6, at §§ 1.01-
1.08.
45 I.R.C. §§ 11, 61 (1983). See generally B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 6, at §§ 5.01-
5.07.
46 1.RLC. § 61(a)(7) (1983).
47 But see supra note 9. By imposing the incidence of taxation on the shareholder of a con-
trolled foreign corporation regardless of whether a dividend is declared or the earnings are repatri-
ated, Subpart F operates, essentially, as an exception to the classical system of U.S. corporate
taxation.
48 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
49 See supra note 46. But see supra note 9.
1985]
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result of the potential disparity in national corporate tax rates.50
Although the corporate tax structures and rates of many developed
countries are similar to that of the United States, large tax differentials
still exist, particularly for tax havens (low-tax jurisdictions)."1 Since the
U.S. corporate tax on worldwide income is not imposed until the profits
of the foreign corporation are repatriated to the United States, the for-
eign corporation with U.S. shareholders need not pay the U.S. tax on
worldwide income as long as the profits are accumulated in the foreign
corporation.52
Clearly, the benefit from deferral is most pronounced when the for-
eign corporation is organized in a low-tax jurisdiction. Moreover,
MNE's can manipulate intracorporate transactions in order to accumu-
late worldwide profits in a subsidiary foreign corporation located in a
low-tax jurisdiction and thereby avoid foreign and U.S. tax altogether.5 3
Therefore, the significant potential benefit of deferral available to the
U.S. shareholders of foreign corporations operates as a strong incentive,
all other considerations being equal, to initially invest U.S. capital in for-
eign operations and, subsequently, to reinvest earnings from such opera-
tions in additional foreign operations.5 4
III. SUBPART F
The goal of tax neutrality is to place an equal tax burden on both
foreign and domestic investment, so that tax consequences do not affect
business decisions. At the same time, however, the congressional deci-
sion to impose a tax often incorporates a conscious policy decision to
50 Since the incidence of U.S. taxation is not imposed on the shareholder until the dividend is
received, the tax on the non-U.S. source and non-effectively connected income of a foreign corpora-
tion is not imposed until the income is repatriated to the United States. As long as the foreign
corporate tax rate is lower than the U.S. corporate tax rate, the foreign corporation will receive the
benefit of deferral until the income is repatriated.
For example, assume a U.S. MNE, the X corporation, has a wholly-owned subsidiary, Y corpo-
ration, which pays a foreign tax at a rate of ten percent whereas the X corporation pays a U.S. tax at
a rate of forty-six percent. Until the profits of the Y corporation are repatriated, the tax differential
of thirty-six percent will not be due. Furthermore, if the profits are never repatriated, but are merely
reinvested in other foreign operations, the incidence of U.S. taxation is delayed further.
51 Tax Havens are low or no tax jurisdictions. They are further characterized by: (1) strong
secrecy laws; (2) modem banking facilities; (3) modem communication facilities; (4) lack of currency
controls; (5) self-promotion as tax minimization jurisdictions; and (6) favorable tax treaties for tax
reduction. See generally 1-3 W. DIAMOND & D. DIAMOND, TAX HAVENS OF THE WORLD (1984);
M. LANGER, PRACTICAL INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING (1979); 1 B. BRACEWELL-MILNES & M.
WISSELINIK, supra note 18, at 67-118; Gordon Report, supra note 18; Pugh, The Deferral Principle
and U.S. Investment in Developing Countries, in UNITED STATES TAXATION AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 267 (R. Hellawell ed. 1980).
52 See supra note 50.
53 See supra note 18.
54 In fact, rarely are "all other considerations equal." See supra note 10.
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encourage or discourage particular business activity such that the tax
consequences do affect business decisions. Any examination of Subpart F
and any consideration of alternatives to Subpart F must reflect the ten-
sion between notions of tax neutrality and notions of conscious tax
policy.
The deferral mechanism operates to favor investments in foreign op-
erations over domestic operations, particularly when the relative differ-
ence between the U.S. and the foreign tax rate is high. Additionally, the
deferral mechanism discourages the repatriation of profits." The com-
plete elimination of deferral for the aliquot share of a U.S. shareholder's
interest in a foreign corporation is within the congressional power. 6 The
double taxation resulting from such a unilateral measure would, how-
ever, impose a serious burden on the foreign operations of U.S. MNE's
relative to local foreign business operations and foreign business opera-
tions of foreign MNE's that benefit from deferral.5 7  Nevertheless, in
1962 Congress enacted Subpart F,58 which was a partial elimination of
deferral for certain kinds of income of certain kinds of foreign
corporations.
The Subpart F provisions were enacted in response to the perception
that the benefit of deferral disproportionately favored foreign investment.
Subpart F terminates deferral and thereby promotes tax neutrality as be-
tween foreign and domestic investment by U.S. MNE's. In addition,
Subpart F reflects a policy of generating U.S. government tax revenue by
taxing U.S. MNE's on some of their worldwide income prior to repatria-
tion while preventing abusive international tax avoidance and removing
the tax incentive to engage in foreign investment.
55 Since the repatriation of profits triggers the incidence of U.S. taxation, U.S. MNE's have
little incentive to do so, absent any compelling statutory provisions.
56 See generally supra notes 2-4, 21-25 and accompanying text. Practically, however, Congress
is limited by considerations of administration and enforcement, and the foreign corporation must be
subject to some U.S. control. Furthermore, it is more feasible to impose such a tax on U.S. share-
holders of foreign corporations, rather than imposing the tax directly on the foreign corporation.
See L. KRAUSE & K. DAM, supra note 4, at 11-13.
57 See Lynn & Wiacek, Keep "Deferral" US. Shareholders Should Not Be Taxed on Foreign
Corporation Income Before They Receive It (1978), reprinted in 3 INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, supra
note 6, at 132-47. But see Federal Tax Reform for 1976: A Compendium 77 (Surrey, Pechman, &
McDaniel eds. 1976), reprinted in 3 INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, supra note 6, at 147-59 [hereinafter
cited as Surrey, Pechman & McDaniel]; P. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT INCOME 143-46 (1969).
58 Revenue Act of Oct. 16, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12(a), 76 Stat. 960, 1006. For an
overview of the mechanics of Subpart F see generally Feinschreiber, supra note 9; 1 R. RHOADS &
M. LANGER, supra note 6, at §§ 3.01-3.06; B. BrrTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 6, at §§ 17.30-
17.34.
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A. Mechanics of Subpart F
Subpart F extends the U.S. tax jurisdiction to certain foreign corpo-
rations which are deemed to be controlled59 by U.S. shareholders.'
Generally, foreign corporations are not subject to U.S. tax unless their
income is U.S. source income or is effectively connected with a U.S. trade
or business.61 Under Subpart F, however, the U.S. shareholders of a con-
trolled foreign corporation (CFC)62 are currently taxed on their aliquot
share of certain designated foreign source income63 accumulated by the
CFC. This operates as a partial, limited exception to the deferral
mechanism. Moreover, it is a limited exception to the usual U.S. corpo-
rate tax system in which a shareholder is taxed only on cash or dispro-
portionate dividends received, and not on corporate income.
The exception, however, is a narrow one. A CFC for the purposes
of Subpart F is defined as "any foreign corporation of which more than
50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock...
is owned [actually or constructively] by . . . United States sharehold-
ers."65 Presumably, if U.S. shareholders had more than fifty percent con-
trol of a foreign corporation, they could then compel a dividend to cover
any current tax on U.S. shareholders. Additionally, the foreign corpora-
tion must be a CFC "for an uninterrupted period of thirty days or more
during any taxable year."66 For the purposes of Subpart F, a U.S. share-
holder67 is a U.S. person68 who owns or is deemed to own ten percent or
59 I.R.C. § 957(a) (1983).
60 Id. §§ 951(b), 7701(a)(8).
61 See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
62 I.R.C. § 957(a) (1983).
63 I.R.C. § 951(a) (1983).
64 Such a regime would seem to violate the Supreme Court's holding in Eisner v. Macomber,
252 U.S. 189 (1920), that a shareholder cannot be taxed, under the Sixteenth Amendment, on a
corporation's issuance of a stock dividend based on accumulated profits. Eisner v. Macomber "re-
mains the most important statement of the Supreme Court on the relationship between the income of
a corporation and the income of its shareholders. Moreover, since the decision was based on an
interpretation of the word 'income' in the sixteenth amendment it raises important constitutional
limitations with respect to [the relationship between] the taxation of corporations and [the taxation
of] shareholders." Gabinet & Coffey, The Implications of the Economic Concept of Income for Cor-
poration-Shareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 895, 897 (1977). Nevertheless,
Subpart F has not been held to be unconstitutional. In fact, the Tax Court in Estate of Leonard E.
Whitlock, 59 T.C. 490 (1972), af'd, 494 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir. 1974), rejected a due process challenge
to the Subpart F provisions.
For an overview of the constitutional and international law limits on Congressional taxing
power see generally supra notes 2-4.
For a discussion of the constitutionality of Subpart F see Horwich, The Constitutionality of
Subpart F ofthe Internal Revenue Code, 19 U. MIAMI L. REv. 400 (1965); L. KRAUSE & K. DAM
supra note 4; Hufbauer & Foster, supra note 10, at 19-21.
65 I.R.C. § 957(a) (1983).
66 Id. § 951(a)(1) (1983).
67 Id. §§ 951(b), 7701(a)(8).
Vol. 17:459
SUBPART F
more69 of the CFC.
These provisions operate to narrow the application of Subpart F.
Only certain U.S. persons that are stock owners qualify as U.S. share-
holders under the "ten percent or more" requirement for Subpart F pur-
poses; and only certain foreign corporations satisfy the "more than 50
percent" requirement for Subpart F purposes. Only "ten percent or
more" shareholders may be utilized to satisfy the "more than 50 percent"
control requirement for Subpart F purposes.
"Subpart F is aimed at closely held foreign corporations. It is not
designed to affect corporations where voting control is broadly held, nor
is it designed to affect foreign corporations that are controlled by nonresi-
dent aliens."70 Additionally, the application of Subpart F is limited to
certain types of designated income,7 1 and there are also express exclu-
sions. 2 The number of qualifications and exceptions coptained within
the Subpart F provisions, which limit its application, suggests that the
provisions are not intended to terminate deferral entirely, but rather to
terminate the abusive, manipulative exploitation of the benefit of deferral.
Subpart F does not raise the problem of double taxation73 of foreign
source income because it contains a liberal foreign tax credit provision
which applies to first, second and third tier foreign corporations.74 Nev-
68 IL §§ 957(d), 7701(a)(30).
69 Id. §§ 951(b), 958(b).
70 See 1 R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, supra note 6, at § 3.02[4][a](1).
71 U.S. shareholders of foreign corporations that are CFC's for an uninterrupted period of
thirty days during any taxable year shall include in their gross income the sum of : (1) the pro rata
share of the corporation's Subpart F income; (2) the pro rata share of previously excluded Subpart F
income withdrawn from investment in less developed countries; (3) the pro rata share of previously
excluded Subpart F income withdrawn from foreign base company shipping operations; and, (4) the
pro rata share of the corporation's increase in earnings invested in U.S. property. I.R.C. § 951(a)(1).
Subpart F income of a CFC is defined in § 952(a) (1983) as the sum of: (1) the income derived from
the insurance of U.S. risks (I.R.C. § 953);'(2) the foreign base company income (I.R.C. § 954); (3)
income attributable to international boycotts; and, (4) amounts of illegal payments which would be
unlawful under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.
72 I.RLC. §§ 951(d), 952(c), 954(b), 957(c), 957(d), 959(a), 960(a), 964(b), 970 (1983).
73 See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
74 I.R.C. § 960 (1983). See generally van Hoorn, supra note 1; Choate, Hurok and Klein, supra
note 4; L. KRAUSE & K. DAM, supra note 4; Sherfy, supra note 5; P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, supra
note 6; Hufbauer & Foster, supra note 10; Gordon Report, supra note 18; Lynn & Wiacek, supra
note 57; Surrey, Pechman & McDaniel, supra note 57; Smith, Taxation of Foreign Business Income -
The Changing Objectives, in TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME 241-55 (rax Institute of America
1966).
The economic impact on the national economy of our tax policy on foreign source income is an
essential consideration in reaching a decision regarding the proper approach. Some of the general
considerations are: (1) the impact of deferral on U.S. foreign investment; (2) the impact of deferral
on U.S. government revenue; (3) the impact of double taxation on U.S. foreign investment; (4) the
impact of double taxation on fiscal evasion, and hence U.S. government revenue; (5) the impact of
Subpart F on U.S. foreign investment; and (6) the impact of Subpart F on fiscal evasion, and hence
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ertheless, the policy of terminating deferral in order to prevent interna-
tional tax avoidance and thereby promote greater tax neutrality is subject
to debate. Moreover, the Subpart F provisions are excessively complex
and in need of reform and simplification.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO SUBPART F
The Subpart F provisions were enacted to generate U.S. government
revenue by taxing U.S. MNE's on some of their worldwide income prior
to repatriation, thereby terminating deferral and preventing abusive in-
ternational tax avoidance. Any alternative to Subpart F, therefore, ought
to similarly remove the disproportionate tax incentive favoring foreign
investment, while at the same time not discouraging foreign investment
altogether. The revenue-generating tax system should neither encourage
nor discourage foreign investment over domestic investment. Rather, the
tax system should be neutral so that business decisions are based upon
non-tax factors in a freely competitive world marketplace. The consider-
ation of potential modifications to the existing regime, established for the
taxation of foreign source income, implicitly highlights the tension be-
tween a tax system that encourages or discourages foreign investment on
the one hand and a tax system that neither encourages nor discourages
foreign investment on the other.
A variety of proposals have been made regarding Subpart F.75 Al-
ternatives to the existing Subpart F regime will now be examined in light
of the following general criteria: (1) the desire for simplification; (2) the
need for administrative convenience; (3) the need for predictability; (4)
the prevention of international tax avoidance; (5) the prevention of
double taxation; and, (6) the desire for pure tax neutrality.76
Simplicity and administrative convenience serve the interest of the
taxpayer by reducing the cost of tax planning, preparation and compli-
ance (i.e., record keeping and legal/accounting fees). Similarly, they
serve the interest of the tax collector by reducing the cost of tax adminis-
tration and enforcement. Predictability serves the interest of the tax-
payer by allowing improved tax planning and it serves the interest of the
tax collector by allowing more accurate revenue projections. The pre-
vention of international tax avoidance serves the interests of the various
national taxing systems that rely on corporate income taxation to fund
U.S. government revenue. An empirical study of these factors is outside the scope of this Note. For
an example of the economic arguments based on the previous considerations see generally supra note
57; O'CONNOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOREIGN TAX BURDEN OF U.S. BASED MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS (1980).
75 See 0. BROWNLEE, TAXING THE INCOME FROM U.S. CORPORATION INVESTMENTS
ABROAD (1979). See generally supra note 74.
76 This Note does not include an empirical analysis. However, the various alternatives will
generally be considered in terms of expanding the application of Subpart F. See supra note 74.
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governmental activity. The elimination of double taxation removes a po-
tential disincentive to international trade. Lastly, tax neutrality pro-
motes an efficient allocation of resources in a freely competitive world
marketplace.
Changes may be made in the taxation of foreign source income in
two basic ways: (1) various minor changes may be made to tighten or
loosen the application of Subpart F and to simplify the requirements of
the existing regime; and, (2) complete alternatives to the existing regime
may be enacted."
A. Changes Within the Existing Regime
One of the major criticisms of Subpart F is that it is unnecessarily
complex.78  The examination of the following collection of alternative
modifications will implicitly assume that it is preferable to have a simple,
easily administered rule to prevent tax avoidance and double taxation
and to promote tax neutrality-even if the rule ends up being underinclu-
sive and/or overinclusive. 9
Initially, within the existing statutory framework, it is possible to
satisfy the general criteria set out above by modifying the controlled for-
eign corporation requirements.80 The existing "more than fifty percent
of the total combined voting power"'" requirement currently operates as
a disincentive for U.S. MNE's to establish majority control of a foreign
corporation. This occurs because a U.S. MNE with an equity position of
forty-nine percent or less retains the benefit of deferral and is not subject
to current U.S. taxation under the Subpart F provisions. In this regard,
the effect of Subpart F comports with the trend in many countries to
require majority local participation in foreign investment. However,
while Subpart F does seek to eliminate deferral, it does not seek to dis-
77 These changes may be accomplished: (1) administratively; (2) judicially; (3) legislatively;
and, (4) by treaty, either bilaterally or multilaterally.
78 See supra note 12.
79 In the case of Subpart F a clear, simple black-letter rule tends to be arbitrary in application.
For example, a fifty-one percent U.S. shareholder of a foreign corporation is taxed currently on the
aliquot share of accumulated profits of the foreign corporation, whereas a forty-nine percent share-
holder continues to receive the benefit of deferral. I.R.C. § 951(a)(1) (1983). This result may in fact
be justified by the ability of a U.S. shareholder with fifty-one percent (i.e. control) to declare a
dividend sufficient to finance the tax liability. Additionally, a ten percent shareholder of a CFC is
subject to the Subpart F provisions, whereas a nine percent shareholder is not. The rationale for the
disparate treatment cannot be explained. Hence, the present Subpart F provisions are not only com-
plex, but also arbitrary. Elimination of some of the complexities of Subpart F would not make the
provisions less arbitrary, but it would make their application simpler as well as more predictable and
uniform.
80 I.R.C. § 957(a) (1983). See Gordon Report, supra note 18, at 341.
81 I.R.C. § 957(a) (1983).
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courage U.S. foreign investment or to restrict U.S. foreign investment to
disadvantageous equity positions.
In order to expand the scope of Subpart F and to alleviate the disin-
centive to majority participation, the "more than 50 percent of the total
combined voting power"82 requirement could theoretically be reduced,
although such a reduction may raise constitutional problems.8 3 Some
U.S. courts have indicated that actual control of a foreign corporation is
the proper test.84 Congress, however, has failed to alter the control re-
quirements of Subpart F,85 despite the existence of a reduced control re-
quirement for CFC's with "income derived from the insurance of United
States risks. . . if the gross amount of premiums or other considerations
. . . exceeds 75 percent of the gross amount of all premiums or other
consideration."8 6 The reduced control requirement for CFC's engaged in
the insurance business suggests either that a reduced control requirement
does not raise constitutional problems or that the taxation of U.S. share-
holders of a CFC is outside the scope of the Eisner v. Macomber
doctrine.8 7
Congress, therefore, could expand the scope of Subpart F by chang-
ing the CFC control requirement to an "actual control" test or, in the
alternative, by reducing the CFC control requirement to twenty-five per-
cent or less. Reducing the control requirement would expand the class of
foreign corporations with U.S. shareholders that are subject to current
U.S. taxation under Subpart F. Expanding Subpart F would further
eliminate deferral and promote tax neutrality between foreign and do-
mestic investment by U.S. shareholders with minority positions in for-
eign corporations.
The practical problem with reducing the control requirement is that
U.S. minority shareholders would be subject to current U.S. taxation on
accumulated earnings of the foreign corporation despite an inability to
82 Id.
83 The problem here is whether U.S. shareholders without control could compel a dividend to
cover the tax on undistributed profits. See generally supra note 64. For an excellent discussion of
the constitutional issues raised by Subpart F, and particularly the potential constitutional problem
resulting from a reduced control test, see Liebman, The Tax Treatment of Joint Venture Income
Under Subpart F. Some Issues and Alternatives, 32 Bus. LAW. 341, 359-88 (1977).
84 The courts were concerned with U.S. MNE's who decontrol their interests in foreign subsid-
iaries to below fifty percent in order to avoid the application of Subpart F, but retain actual control.
Garlock Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 423 (1972), affid, 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973), cert denied,
417 U.S. 911, 94 S. Ct. 2608 (1974); Kraus v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 681 (1973), aff'd, 490 F.2d 898
(2d Cir. 1974); Koehring Co. v. United States, 583 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1978). But see CCA, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 137 (1975).
85 I.R.C. § 957(a) (1983). See also Liebman, supra note 24, at 1821-25.
86 I.R.C. § 957(b) (1983) (the reduced control requirement is "twenty-five percent of total vot-
ing power").
87 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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effectuate a distribution to finance the tax. Such a regime is inapposite to
the classical system of corporate taxation required by the Supreme Court
in Eisner v. Macomber.8' The existing "more than 50 percent" control
requirement of Subpart F arguably satisfies Eisner v. Macomber, since the
shareholders could compel a dividend to cover any current tax. Con-
gress has already enacted certain statutory exceptions to the classical sys-
tem of corporate taxation,89 and many commentators have argued in
favor of completely terminating this system and adopting the integrated
approach to corporate taxation.
Under Subpart F, only "ten percent or more" shareholders may be
utilized to satisfy the "more than 50 percent" control requirement. 0
The category of U.S. shareholders for Subpart F purposes could be ex-
panded by reducing the "ten percent or more" requirement to five per-
cent or less. This change would expand the class of shareholders to
which Subpart F applies and, consequently, would expand the class of
foreign corporations to which Subpart F applies. 91 Expanding the scope
of Subpart F by reducing the shareholder requirement would minimize
the existing tax benefit of deferral available to shareholders of CFC's
with less than ten percent control. The reduced shareholder requirement
would promote greater tax neutrality between foreign and domestic in-
vestment. If the minimum shareholder requirement were eliminated al-
together, tax administration would be simplified.
The practical problem with reducing the shareholder requirement is
that a shareholder with a small equity position in a CFC will not likely
be able to manipulate the business activities of the CFC to effectuate a
distribution or to reduce overall tax liabilities through intracorporate
pricing mechanisms. On the other hand, under the current Subpart F
provisions, a shareholder with a small equity position receives the benefit
of deferral.
Additionally, the requirement that a foreign corporation be a CFC
"for an uninterrupted period of thirty days or more during any taxable
year"92 could be reduced or eliminated. Instead, a CFC could be taxed
under Subpart F for the period when the control requirements are satis-
88 Id. See supra note 64.
89 See, eg., I.RtC. § 531 (1983) (accumulated earnings tax). See generally B. BrrrKER & J.
EusncE, supra note 6, at §§ 8.01-8.09; B. BrrrKER & L. EBB, supra note 6, at 327-28.
90 1.RLC. § 951(b) (1983). See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. See also Gordon
Report, supra note 18, at 341.
91 I.R.C. §§ 951(b), 958(b) (1983). See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The current
Subpart F provisions do not apply to shareholders with less than ten percent of the CFC. Therefore,
a foreign corporation with ten U.S. shareholders each holding nine percent (i.e., a total of ninety
percent voting control) is not subject to Subpart F; whereas, a foreign corporation with five U.S.
shareholders each holding eleven percent (i.e. total of fifty-five percent voting control) is subject to
Subpart F.
92 I.R.C. § 951(a) (1983).
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fled. This change would further expand the class of CFC's to which Sub-
part F applies and would promote simplicity, predictability and
administrative convenience.
Another general method for expanding the application of Subpart F
is to eliminate many of the relief provisions which exempt certain classes
of income from the provisions of Subpart F.93 The current Subpart F
provisions do not tax the income of a CFC if it is established that
"neither the creation or organization of such controlled foreign corpora-
tion. . . nor. . . the transaction giving rise to such income. . . has as
one of its significant purposes a substantial reduction of income...
taxes.",94 The inclusion of a "tax reduction motive" test in this context is
meaningless; all business decisions will minimize tax to maximize profits.
Even if there is no purpose to reduce tax, the effect of the benefit of defer-
ral to favor foreign investment over domestic investment by U.S. MNE's
remains the same. The elimination of this exemption, particularly for
CFC's which are organized in low-tax jurisdictions, would greatly ease
the administrative burden of revenue authorities-and simplify the appli-
cation of the provisions of Subpart F.95
Moreover, the provision which excludes Subpart F treatment when
foreign base company income is less than ten percent of the gross income
of a CFC96 could be reduced or eliminated altogether. The provision
which applies Subpart F treatment to the entire gross income of a CFC
when the foreign base company income exceeds seventy percent97 could
also be modified so that the de minimus figure for Subpart F treatment is
fifty percent or less. If adopted, each of these modifications to the ex-
isting regime for the taxation of foreign source income would expand the
application of Subpart F, thereby minimizing the favored treatment of
foreign investment provided by the benefit of deferral.
The taxation of foreign source income under Subpart F could be
expanded by reducing the CFC control requirement, eliminating the
shareholder control requirement and eliminating many of the relief pro-
visions contained in Subpart F. These modifications would promote
greater tax neutrality by expanding the scope of Subpart F and thereby
terminating the benefit of deferral. Moreover, the expansion of particu-
lar provisions of Subpart F would reduce the opportunity for interna-
93 This could be accomplished by eliminating the designated income categories of LRC.
§ 951(a) and, instead, imposing current U.S. tax on U.S. shareholders for their aliquot share of
income of a CFC. Additionally, the following express exemptions included with the current Subpart
F provisions could be modified or eliminated: I.R.C. §§ 951(d), 952(c), 954(b), 957(c), 957(d),
959(a), 960(a), 964(b), 970 (1983).
94 I.R.C. § 954(b)(4) (1983).
95 See Liebman, supra note 83, at 390-95.




tional tax avoidance. Thus, the costs of tax planning and compliance
would be reduced, and tax collection would be simplified.
However, to the extent that the double taxation burden arising from
expanding the scope of Subpart F is not mitigated by the foreign tax
credit, these modifications will discourage U.S. MNE's from engaging in
foreign trade due to the potentially excessive tax liability. Additionally,
these modifications may result in U.S. MNE's being at a competitive dis-
advantage with their foreign counterparts that retain the benefit of defer-
ral. At the same time, though, the expansion of the Subpart F provisions
would eliminate the incentive to defer the repatriation of earnings and
profits from U.S.-owned foreign corporations. Although these modifica-
tions would promote greater tax neutrality and improved predictability
for both the taxpayer and tax collector through simplification, none
would achieve the goal of significantly simplifying Subpart F.
B. Significant Simplification of Subpart F
In order to achieve a significant simplification of Subpart F, it is
necessary to enact statutory provisions that are clear and concise. Such
rules may necessarily be underinclusive and overinclusive.98 However,
such rules will be predictable.
One possibility in this regard is to eliminate the designated income
categories for a CFC.99 This would greatly simplify the Subpart F provi-
sions and eliminate some of the subjective elements of the current regime
which requires the allocation of income into certain designated catego-
ries. Under this modification, the U.S. shareholders of a foreign corpora-
tion that satisfied the CFC requirements would be currently taxed on
their aliquot share of all accumulated earnings, not merely those catego-
ries designated in the statute. The harshness of this result would be miti-
gated by the foreign tax credit, and it would have its greatest impact in
low-tax jurisdictions where the benefit of deferral is the greatest due to
the large tax rate differential between the U.S. and the foreign corporate
tax rate.
This proposal is equivalent to the complete termination of deferral
for a CFC. The effect would be to end the abusive tax minimization uses
of the deferral mechanism, particularly in low-tax jurisdictions, and to
encourage the repatriation of profits. The problems under the existing
regime, however, are that eliminating the designated income categories
may: (1) encourage U.S. MNE's to decontrol and take minority posi-
tions in foreign operations;" ° (2) encourage foreign governments to in-
98 See supra note 79.
99 See supra note 93.
100 See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text. Such a move to decontrol may in the long
run harm U.S. MNE's operating overseas because they will lose management control over their
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crease local taxes when they realize that the U.S. MNE is not benefiting
from the low-tax concession; and, (3) harm U.S. MNE's in comparison
to foreign competitors, since foreign MNE's may continue to benefit
from deferral.'
The benefits of deferral are not as advantageous for CFC's organized
in high-tax jurisdictions. Therefore, it might be preferable to adopt a
regime for the taxation of foreign source income which focuses on the
nature and location of the CFC1°2 and to abandon the U.S. regime which
focuses on designated categories of "tainted income."' 1 3 If this approach
were adopted, and a foreign corporation was a CFC organized in a statu-
torily designated jurisdiction, Subpart F would apply and the U.S. share-
holder would be currently taxable on the aliquot share of income.
Such a "designated jurisdiction" approach would be both underin-
clusive and overinclusive in terms of the abusive use of deferral to avoid
taxation. Some of the currently taxable income of the CFC would be
foreign source income that is legitimately connected with the active con-
duct of a trade or business located in the designated jurisdiction (i.e.
overinclusive). However, excessive income accumulated in a non-desig-
nated, high-tax jurisdiction, that is not as high as in the United States,
would avoid the impact of the Subpart F provisions and continue to get
the benefit of deferral (i.e. underinclusive).
The "designated jurisdiction" approach would essentially impose an
irrebuttable presumption of tax-avoidance purpose for U.S. shareholders
engaged in business activities through the use of CFC's in designated
low-tax jurisdictions. Although there are certain legitimate (i.e. non-tax
avoidance) motives for organizing foreign subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdic-
tions," 4 the primary benefit is the minimization of tax liability. By im-
posing a strong or irrebuttable presumption of tax avoidance purpose and
shifting the burden of proof to the taxpayer, U.S. shareholders of a CFC
organized in a low-tax jurisdiction would be automatically and entirely
subject to current taxation on their aliquot share of income of the CFC,
unless the shareholder could prove that the foreign source income of the
foreign financial investments. Foreign majority shareholders may then operate the business in a
manner that is inconsistent with the best interest of U.S. MNE's that are minority shareholders.
101 See generally Note, Comparative Analysis of Systems of Domestic Taxation of Controlled
Foreign Corporations, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 99 (1981); Rosensweig, United States Interna-
tional Tax Treaty Policy with Respect to Foreign Imputation Systems of Corporate-Shareholder Taxa-
tion, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 729 (1981).
102 See Note, supra note 101, at 131-48.
103 By focusing on the location of CFC's, rather than types of income, Subpart F would be-
come, in effect, inapplicable to relatively high tax jurisdictions. See Note, supra note 101, at 169;
Gordon Report, supra note 18, at 337-39.
104 Some of these are: (1) to avoid currency and other controls; (2) to minimize risk of expro-
priation of business assets; (3) to shield assets from political oppression; and, (4) to maintain finan-
cial privacy. See Gordon Report, supra note 18, at 205-09, 224-26.
Vol. 17:459
SUBPART F
CFC was legitimately connected with a trade or business in the desig-
nated jurisdiction. °5 Furthermore, such a regime would begin to solve
the access to information problem faced by U.S. tax authorities when
auditing the returns of CFC's,'1 6 thereby promoting administrative
convenience.
Another alternative which would simplify the provisions of Subpart
F is to employ a "minimum distribution" approach.0 7 The benefit of
deferral encourages foreign investment and discourages the repatriation
of profits. Subpart F operates as a partial termination of deferral for a
CFC. Subpart F is not intended to discourage foreign investment, but
rather to remove the tax incentive favoring foreign investment. The
"minimum distribution" approach would require a CFC to repatriate a
fixed percentage of earnings or be subject to current taxation under Sub-
part F. The "minimum distribution" approach "would require that
deferral be eliminated unless a firm conformed to a minimum distribu-
tion schedule, with the schedule relating the minimum repatriation ratio
to the difference between the U.S. tax rate and the rates of the country of
operation."' 10 8 The proposal would essentially terminate deferral for
CFC's and then grant exceptions if a certain distribution level is satisfied.
This would greatly simplify the mechanics of Subpart F and would also
solve the information gathering problem associated with CFC's.
Another alternative, which is related to the one just examined, is to
employ an "unreasonable accumulation" approach." ° Since the deferral
mechanism discourages the repatriation of profits to the United States,
CFC's tend to retain and accumulate funds overseas beyond their ordi-
nary business needs. The benefit of such accumulation is particularly
pronounced for the passive income of CFC's organized in low-tax juris-
105 For example, Japan taxes shareholders on their aliquot share of undistributed profits of
CFC's in "designated jurisdictions" unless the following five requirements are met:
(1) [t]he foreign subsidiary must have a fixed place of business in the tax haven, (2) the
foreign subsidiary's business operations in the tax haven must be independently managed
and controlled by a local staff, (3) the foreign subsidiary's principal business must not
consist of holding securities, licensing industrial property rights, know-how, or copyrights;
or, leasing shipping vessels or aircraft, (4) dividends received from designated tax haven
subsidiaries must not exceed 5% of the foreign subsidiary's total current revenues, and (5)
the majority of the foreign subsidiary's business must be conducted in the tax haven; or, in
the case of banks and sales, trust, securities, insurance, shipping, and air freight companies,
more than 50% of the volume in the foreign subsidiary's principal line of business during
the fiscal year must be transacted with unrelated parties.
Special Tax Measures Law (sozei tokubetsu sochiho), art. 66-6(2)(i) (1978), cited in Note, supra note
101, at 144-45.
106 Many low-tax jurisdictions have secrecy laws which prevent the IRS from scrutinizing the
financial records of CFC's. See supra note 51.
107 See L. KRAUSE & K. DAM, supra note 4, at 99.
108 Id.
109 See id. at 19-21; Task Force, supra note 9, at 408.
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dictions. There is no compelling reason to organize a CFC in a low-tax
jurisdiction to hold properties, such as patents or securities, which
merely receive passive income, other than to avoid the current incidence
of U.S. tax.
The "unreasonable accumulation" approach would impose the inci-
dence of U.S. tax on levels of retained earnings that exceed an amount
reasonably necessary for the conduct of the foreign trade or business.
Such a regime would, therefore, encourage either the repatriation of
earnings or the reinvestment of earnings in foreign operations, or both,
because there would no longer be a tax benefit from accumulating earn-
ings in a CFC. Moreover, this approach would simplify the taxation of
foreign source income and would be easy to administer. The problem
with this approach is that U.S. MNE's could retain the benefit of deferral
and avoid current taxation by continuously reinvesting profits overseas.
As a result, however, the goal of tax neutrality would not be achieved.
C. Complete Alternatives to Subpart F
Several alternatives to Subpart F may accomplish the objective of
preventing the most blatant abuses of deferral associated with low-tax
jurisdictions. These alternatives will now be considered.110
1. Section 482 Allocation of Income Doctrine
One weapon which the ievenue authorities might employ in the
place of Subpart F is to allocate income among related corporate entities
engaged in international business transactions.111 Under section 482,112
U.S. revenue authorities have the power to scrutinize transactions be-
tween related organizations and to allocate income and prices on an
arm's length basis. Income of a CFC organized in a low-tax jurisdiction
could be allocated to reflect prices in a competitive market. Thus, U.S.
revenue authorities could collect a tax on the income allocated to the
U.S. shareholder of the CFC. This power would enable the revenue au-
thorities to overcome some of the most abusive methods of international
tax avoidance.
The accumulation of profits by CFC's organized in low-tax jurisdic-
tions is accomplished through such mechanisms as: (1) artificial intra-
110 See 0. BROWNLEE, supra note 75.
111 See generally Kauder, Taxation of Domestically Controlled Foreign Corporations: A Com-
parative Study of Subpart F and Section 482, 14 VILL. L. REv. 260 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Comparative Study]; Surrey, Reflections on the Allocation of Income and Expenses Among National
Tax Jurisdictions, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 409 (1978); Kauder, International Allocations of
Income: Problems of Administration and Compliance, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1974); Note, Mul-
tinational Corporations and Income Allocation Under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1202, 1204.06 (1976).
112 I.R.C. § 482 (1983).
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corporate pricing mechanisms; (2) manipulating management and service
fees; and, (3) transferring passive income-producing assets to the CFC.
Under section 482, revenue authorities could scrutinize intracorporate
transactions to determine whether income is being reasonably allocated.
If the transaction is related to a legitimate business objective and reflects
arm's length bargaining, then the income of the CFC would retain the
benefit of deferral until repatriated. If, however, the transaction is a
sham and fails to reflect arm's length bargaining, then revenue authori-
ties could allocate income on the basis of arm's length economic activity,
in which case the benefit of deferral would be unavailable. The principal
distinction between the approach of Subpart F and the approach of sec-
tion 482 is that "Subpart F accepts the critical transactions as they are
devised by the parties and taxes them at the shareholder level if they
meet the statutory definitions, while under section 482 the transactions
are recast and indeed may be disregarded for tax purposes."'1 13
Under section 482, a tax reduction motive is not relevant. Rather,
the important inquiry is whether the business transaction would have
occurred under arm's length bargaining. This determination, however, is
not an easy one. The problem with allocating income under section 482
is that initially the revenue authorities will have difficulty gaining access
to the financial information of the CFC. Secondly, it is very difficult to
determine a true arm's length price.1 4 Therefore, determining an arm's
length price is administratively inefficient and may be economically ineffi-
cient from a tax revenue perspective (i.e., costs of administration exceed
increased revenue). Moreover, allocating income under section 482 does
not achieve predictable results because the taxpayer does not know what
arm's length price will be determined by the revenue authorities.
2. Unitary Tax Approach
As a complete alternative to the separate entity theory utilized by
section 482, the taxation of the foreign source income of U.S. MNE's
could be accomplished by a unitary tax system." 5 This method treats
groups of affiliated corporations as a single business with, essentially, a
single balance sheet. The allocation of income under the unitary tax
method is generally accomplished through the use of a mechanical
formula based upon a combination of the factors of production (i.e., pay-
roll, assets and land)." 6 The formula operates to automatically allocate
113 See Comparative Study, supra note 111, at 266.
114 Often no market exists for the goods or services at issue and there is the added problem of
allocating research and development, fixed costs, management and consulting costs, etc.
115 See Note, supra note 111, at 1223-31.
116 It may be, however, that the unitary tax will operate to allocate income from the CFC in a
low-tax jurisdiction to the foreign country where mining, production or manufacturing occurred,
rather than allocating the income to the United States where the MNE headquarters is located.
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income of the MNE among the various tax jurisdictions in proportion to
the percentage of total income generated within the respective
jurisdictions.
The United States, therefore, could proportionately tax the world-
wide income of U.S. MNE's based upon the formula, thereby eliminating
the need for Subpart F. In contrast to the policy of promoting arm's
length negotiation under section 482, the unitary tax treats a group of
related corporations as a unitary business. "Since all [MNE] subsidiaries
[would be] considered to be parts of the same unitary business, intercom-
pany transactions [would not] produce a real economic profit or loss and
[would] therefore be eliminated from tax consideration." '117 In effect, the
United States would currently tax that proportion of the MNE's world-
wide income which is allocated to the United States under the formula.
The theoretical appeal of such a method is its general fairness to tax
jurisdictions (depending on the formula selected), its predictability and
its relative simplicity compared to the provisions of Subpart F. More-
over, the unitary tax approach does not present the administrative diffi-
culties that are present when determining arm's length pricing under
section 482. However, the unitary approach raises new administrative
difficulties. First, selecting an objectively reasonable formula which
properly allocates income would be difficult. Second, the unitary ap-
proach would require corporate groups to keep an entirely new and sepa-
rate set of books for the whole corporate group. Moreover, in the
absence of an international agreement on a uniform, equitable formula,
the unitary tax approach would likely raise problems of double taxation,
as each nation selected allocation formulas that favored their productive
contribution to the income of the MNE.
3. Treaties
One of the major criticisms of Subpart F is that by partially elimi-
nating deferral and imposing a current tax on shareholder's aliquot share
of the undistributed earnings of a CFC, Subpart F discourages U.S.
MNE's from engaging in foreign operations.11 8 The unilateral termina-
tion of deferral would promote tax neutrality, prevent international tax
avoidance and increase U.S. tax revenue. In the long run, however, such
unilateral measures would operate as a disincentive for U.S. MNE's to
engage in foreign operations.
Foreign competitors who retain the benefit of deferral gain a com-
petitive advantage from the unilateral termination of deferral by the
United States. The advantage arises because local foreign businesses are
only subject to local tax, and foreign MNE's that receive the benefit of
117 See Note, supra note 111, at 1206.
118 See Lynn & Wiaek, supra note 57.
Vol. 17-459
SUBPART F
deferral are only subject to local tax, whereas the U.S. MNE would be
subject to both the local tax and the U.S. tax.
The adoption, therefore, of any or all of the previous proposals as a
means of effectuating the termination of deferral, solely on a unilateral
basis, may ultimately result in reduced revenue to the U.S. treasury be-
cause U.S. MNE's will no longer be able to compete as effectively in
international trade. Thus, the United States should seek to establish a
treaty regime, or series of executive agreements, which would facilitate
the collective elimination of deferral for western, industrialized capital-
exporting states.' 19 If established, such a regime would promote tax neu-
trality between foreign and domestic investment, while eliminating the
inherently uncompetitive aspect of unilateral action. A potential limita-
tion to the collective elimination of deferral through a treaty regime is
that a tax policy based on the existence of tax treaties raises the following
general problems: (1) favorable bilateral treaties encourage "treaty shop-
ping;" (2) the negotiation process is inordinately slow; and, (3) treaties
cannot increase the U.S. taxation of U.S. persons. On the other hand, tax
treaties benefit taxpayers through increased predictability, greater uni-
formity and reduced tax liability.
Although a treaty is the supreme law of the land, 2 ' a tax treaty
alone could not replace Subpart F and terminate the effect of deferral by
imposing a current tax on the income of a CFC. This is because the
Constitution prevents treaties from being used to raise revenue by in-
creasing the tax burden of U.S. persons. 2' Rather, the general function
of tax treaties is to allocate and reduce the tax burden of the citizens of
the signatory nations. In other words, treaties do not increase taxes, but
rather they mutually reduce the taxes for the citizens of the respective
signatory states. Treaties lower foreign tax rates for U.S. persons who
invest in countries with which the United States has treaties, thereby en-
couraging U.S. MNE's to engage in international trade. Moreover, U.S.
treaty policy has likely facilitated foreign investment in the United States
by lowering tax rates for the citizens of U.S. treaty partners who invest in
the United States.
A treaty, therefore, has no effect on how the United States taxes it
citizens, nor on how the other signatory taxes its citizens. In this regard,
119 See generally Gordon Report, supra note 18, at 232-33, 349-51, 414-18.
120 The U.S. Constitution provides that the President of the United States "shall have power,
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties. . . . U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2. Moreover, "[A]II Treaties made . . . shall be the supreme law of the Land. ... U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
121 "All Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. ... U.S.
CON ST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
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for example, the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty122 contains a savings
clause which provides that "[n]otwithstanding any provision of this Con-
vention . . . a Contracting State may tax its residents . . . and . . . its
citizens, as if their Convention had not come into effect." 12' Further-
more, the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty provides that "[tjhis Conven-
tion shall not restrict in any manner any exclusion, exemption,
deduction, credit or other allowance now or hereafter accorded .... ,124
Thus, tax treaties have not been negotiated in order to alter the way the
United States taxes its own citizens.
Traditionally, the U.S. government's interest in the negotiation of
tax treaties has been threefold: (1) to prevent double taxation;1 25 (2) to
minimize fiscal evasion; 12 and, (3) to simplify tax administration.127
Whether the U.S. tax treaty program has accomplished these objectives
is subject to debate.1 28 Nevertheless, the U.S. government could effec-
tively supplement our national tax system's unilateral response to the
problem of deferral through the inclusion of a "deferral provision" in
existing or future tax treaties by which the United States would agree
with the tax treaty partner to mutually terminate deferral. Such a provi-
sion would encourage a more uniform approach to the problem of defer-
ral while eliminating the potential disadvantage to U.S. MNE's that
arises from the unilateral termination of deferral. Each signatory could
agree to impose a current tax on their respective CFC's, subject to a
credit for foreign taxes paid. Thus, MNE's would no longer be able to
take advantage of the inherent limitations on the power of national tax
jurisdictions to tax international business transactions.
In this way, complete minimization of international tax (i.e., an "in-
ternational tax loophole" in which no country receives tax revenue from
MNE's due to, e.g., intracompany pricing mechanisms) could be pre-
vented through collective, partial or complete, termination of deferral on
a uniform basis. This would prevent the harm arising from unilateral tax
measures. In fact, many of the major western, industrialized capital ex-
porting countries have enacted some form of tax system that is analogous
122 See United States Model Income Tax Treaty (1977), reprinted in 3 R. RHOADES & M.
LANGER, supra note 6, at § 15.02.
123 Id. at § 15.0211](3).
124 Id. at § 15.0211](2).
125 Tax treaties eliminate double taxation primarily through the uniform definition of: (1)
source rules; (2) residence; (3) permanent establishment; (4) income; (5) profits; (6) dividends; (7)
interest; (8) royalties; (9) capital gains; and, (10) creditability of taxes. See 3 R. RHOADEs & M.
LANGER, supra note 6, at § 15.02.
126 Tax treaties attempt to prevent fiscal evasion through exchange of information and compe-
tent authority provisions which promote administrative convenience for the tax authorities and pre-
dictability for taxpayers. Id.
127 Id. at § 15.02(26).
128 See Owens, supra note 7. But see Trelles, supra note 7.
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to Subpart F.129 Encouraging international uniformity through a series
of tax treaty amendments or executive agreements should, therefore, not
be difficult.
V. CONCLUSION
The Subpart F provisions focus on the most abusive tax avoidance
associated with low-tax jurisdictions, by taxing controlled foreign corpo-
rations (CFC's) on designated income. Although the provisions are ef-
fective as a partial termination of the benefit of deferral, they are
excessively complex and in need of reform and simplification. In order to
promote greater tax neutrality and to prevent international tax avoid-
ance, the provisions of Subpart F could be expanded and simplified by:
(1) reducing the control test for CFC status to twenty-five percent; (2)
reducing the shareholder test to five percent or less; (3) adopting a "des-
ignated jurisdiction" approach; (4) imposing a strong, if not irrebuttable,
presumption of tax avoidance purpose for CFC's organized in low-tax
jurisdictions; and, (5) eliminating the "designated income" approach of
Subpart F and taxing all CFC income, subject to the foreign tax credit
for foreign taxes paid. However, these modifications are not without
their limitations.
In fact, the current international regime for the taxation of multina-
tional enterprises (MNE's) by national tax jurisdictions is characterized
by both practical and legal inadequacies. The taxpayer who is engaged in
international business transactions faces the potential burden of double
taxation, while tax authorities must address the problem of international
tax avoidance. National responses to these problems have largely been
ineffective due to the inconsistency of the various national approaches.
Thus, in order to promote tax neutrality and prevent international tax
avoidance, the United States must seek to establish a uniform, interna-
tional scheme for the taxation of MNE's. Reliance on international
agreements to provide for the uniform taxation of all international busi-
ness transactions is the best method to accomplish these objectives.
129 See Note, supra note 101.
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